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THE CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
THE STATE LEGISLATURE AND THE CON-
GRESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
ENACTMENT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION ACTS BY THE STATES AND THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT OF
1908
This question will be discussed in the broadest form, viz., with
respect to the enactment by the states of the United States, of
laws creating a scheme of social insurance, compulsory in form,
that is to say, insurance against sickness, accidents, invalidity,
old-age pensions, out-of-work, and pensions for wives of work-
men during the period (8 weeks or more) of "confinement."
INTRODUCTION
The compensation acts of thirty-one states now in, operation'
provide limited universal compensation for injured workmen, or
dependents of workmen injured in the due course (or arising
out) of their employment. These acts provide for the payment
of compensation for injuries in most states to all public
employees, and all employees engaged in employments where
four, five, six or more are regularly employed, or to employees in
a large list of the so-called hazardous employments.
That workmen's compensation acts may further provide com-
pulsory insurance against sickness, invalidity, old-age, out-of-
work, and confinement of wives of workmen, limited in amounts
to conserve the public purpose involved, follows from lines of
reasoning which justify compulsory state insurance against the
loss of wages, arising out of physical injuries to employees.
Many acts of the state legislatures have been passed recently
providing mothers' pensions, which have been sustained by the
courts.2
I io N. C. C. A. 1-69, note under Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury.
'Bulletin of U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 186 (for I915), pp.
305, 340, 375, 378, 393, 398, 418, 435; Debrot v. Marion County, i45 N. W.
467 (Supreme Court of Iowa, February i9th, 1914).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
I
The question proposed for discussion is: May workmen's
compensation acts be made to apply to employees and employers
engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, for whom a rule of
liability or method of compensation has not been created by Con-
gress? And, specifically speaking, can employers engaged in
interstate commerce operating in New York state, be compelled to
compensate their employees injured in New York state, in accord-
ance with the provision of the New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, notwithstanding the existence of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. L. 65), or even not-
withstanding the existence of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act of 19o6 (34 Stat. L. 232), which applied to "every common
carrier" engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, while the
former act applies only to carrier by railroad. In other words,
has Congress, in enacting said employers' liability acts, enacted
workmen's compensation acts respecting workmen employed by
interstate railways, or by common carriers engaged in interstate
or foreign commerce?
The New York Compensation Act of New York especting
employers and employees engaged in interstate and foreign com-
merce provides, Sec. 114:
"Sec. 114. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. The provisions of
this chapter shall apply to employers and employees
engaged in intrastate and also in interstate or for-
eign commerce, for whom a rule of liability or
method of compensation has been or may be estab-
lished by the Congress of the United States, only to
the extent -that their mutual connection with intrastate
work may and shall be clearly separable and distinguish-
able from interstate or foreign commerce, except that such
employer and his employees working only in this state
may, subject to the approval and in the manner provided
by the commission and so far as not forbidden by any
act of Congress, accept and become bound by the pro-
visions of this chapter in like manner and with the same
effect in all respects as provided herein for other employers
and their employees."
The Federal Employers' Liability Act (H. R. 203io, approved
April 22, 19o8), Sec. 2, provides:
"That every common carrier by railroad in the terri-
tories, the District of Columbia, the Panama Canal Zone,
or other possessions of the United States, shall be liable
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in damages to any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier in any of said jurisdictions, or,
in case of the death of such employee, to his or her per-
sonal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow
or husband and children of such employee; and, if none,
then of such employee's parents, and, if none, then of the
next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such
injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency,
due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances,
machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves or other
equipment."
This act modified the rigor of the common law defenses, abro-
gating the common law defenses of the "fellow-servant rule,"
introducing the doctrine of "comparative negligence" and abol-
ishing the common law defense of "assumed risk" in certain
cases. One could well say that the effect of the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act of 19o6, and that of 19o8 likewise, is to diminish
the effectiveness of the three common law defenses by one-half
or more, and to enlarge the frequency of recoveries, for injured
workmen affected, by twenty per cent.
The offending section of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
of June I, 19o6,4 which was held unconstitutional in Howard,
admx. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 207 U. S. 463, etc., reads as follows --
"Sec. i. That every common carrier engaged in trade
or commerce in the District of Columbia, or in any terri-
tory of the United States, or between the several states,
or between any territory and another, or between any ter-
ritory or territories and any state or states, or the District
of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the Dis-
trict of Columbia and any state or states or foreign
nations, shall be liable to any of its employees, or, in the
case of his death, to his personal representative for the
benefit of his widow and children, if any; if none, then
for his parents; if none, then for the next of kin depend-
ent upon him,--for .all damages which may result from
the negligence of any of its officers, agents, or employees,
or by reason of any defect or insufficiency due to its
negligence in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery,
track, roadbed, ways, or works."
"Economic Basis of Workmen's Compensation Acts, Michigan Law
Review, Vol. X, No. 3, March, I9m.
"34 Stat. L. 232, Chap. 3073, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 891.
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Paragraph "2" of the syllabus reads:
"A regulation of intrastate as well as of interstate com-
merce, and therefore one beyond the power of Congress
to enact, is made by the provision of the Employers' Lia-
bility Act of June I1, 19o6 (34 Stat. L. 232,, chap. 3o73
U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 891), that 'every com-
mon carrier engaged in trade or commerce' in the Dis-
trict of Columbia or in the territories or between the
several states shall be liable for the death or injury of
'any of its employees' which may result from the
negligence of 'any of its officers, agents or employees.'"
And at page 504 the court by J. White says:
"Concluding as we do, that the statute, while it embraces
subjects within the authority of Congress to regulate com-
merce, also includes subjects not within its constitutional
power, and that the two are so interblended in the statute
that they are incapable of separation, we are of the opinion
that the courts below rightly held the statute to be repug-
nant to the Constitution and nonenforceable; and the
judgments below are, therefore, affirmed."
J. Miller of the Supreme Court of New York in Jensen v.
Southern Pacific Company, 215 N. Y. -, construing Sec. 114 of
the New York Workmen's Compensation Act in its relation to
or conflict with Sec. 2 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
of 19o8 and that of 19o6 (declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of the United States), 5 said:
"It is next claimed that the statute was not intended to
apply to employment in interstate or foreign commerce
and that in case of doubt that construction should be
adopted, for otherwise it would offend against the com-
merce clause of the Federal Constitution by imposing a
burden upon such commerce. The latter claim will be
noticed first. The statute does not purport directly to
regulate or impose a burden upon commerce, but merely
undertakes to regulate the relations between employers
and employees in this state. Such regulation may, and
no doubt does, indirectly affect commerce, but to the extent
that it may affect interstate or foreign commerce it is
plainly within the jurisdiction of the state, until Congress
by entering the field excludes state action. (Sherlock v.
Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana,
118 U. S. 455; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137; Simpson
5 Howard v. Ill. Central R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 463-54i.
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v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352; Erie R. R. Co. v. Williams,
233 U. S. 685).
Literally construed, section 114 makes the statute apply
only to intrastate work, either done by itself or in connec-
tion with, but clearly separable and distinguishable from,
interstate or foreign commerce. But, though the section
is awkwardly phrased, it is manifest that a broader appli-
cation was intended, else the clause 'for whom a rule of
liability or method of compensation has been or may be
established by the Congress of the United States' is mean-
ingless. The legislature evidently intended to regulate as
far as it had the power, all employments within the state
of the kinds enumerated. The earlier sections are in
terms of general application, and section 114, which is
headed 'Interstate Commerce,' is one of limitation, not
of definition. Its obvious purpose was to guard against
a construction violative of the Constitution of the United
States, and so it is provided that the act should apply to
interstate or foreign commerce, 'for whom a rule of
liability or method of compensation has been or may be
established by the Congress of the United States,' only to
the extent that intrastate work affected may or shall be
clearly separable or distinguishable therefrom. In other
words, the legislature said that it did not intend to enter
any field from which it had been or should be excluded
by the action of the Congress of the United States. But
it is said that Congress may at any time regulate employ-
ments in'interstate or foreign commerce, and that the case
is one in which a rule 'may be established,' etc. Again,
the spirit, not the letter, must control. If it had been
intended to confine the application of the act to intrastate
work, the legislature would doubtless have said so in a
sentence. The words 'may be' should be construed in
sense of 'shall be.'
One other question in respect to the application of the
act remains to be considered. It is said that the appellant
is a carrier by railroad, and that, therefore, the Federal
Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 19o8 (35 Stat. L.
65), prescribes the rule governing the employment in
which the deceased was engaged. As far as this case is
concerned the appellant is a carrier by water. Its business
is transportation by steamships, which, as far as it appears,
may not even indirectly be related to transportation by
railroad, certainly not by any particular line of railroad.
It is insignificant that the earlier federal statute of June
ii, 19o6 (34 Stat. L. 232), applied to 'every common
carrier' engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, whilst
the present act applies only to carriers by railroad. There
is nothing in the act indicative of a purpose .to apply it to
carriage by water, if it happen to be conducted by a rail-
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road corporation, and not otherwise-to apply one rule of
liability to transportation by a steamship line, if owned
and operated by a railroad corporation, and a different
rule to precisely similar transportation not thus controlled.
The federal act provides a rule of liability of carriers by
railroad for injury or death 'resulting in whole or in
part * * * by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to
its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery,
track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equip-
ment.' The words 'boats' and 'wharves' may be given
due effect by applying them to adjuncts or auxiliaries to
transportation by railroad.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the employment in
which the deceased was engaged was not governed by the
federal statute, that the Workmen's Compensation Act
applied to it, and that the latter act is not violative of the
Federal Constitution for attempting directly to regulate or
impose a tax or burden on interstate or foreign commerce."
In other words the Supreme Court of the United States
declared the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 19o6 unconsti-
tutional because its provisions applied both to employees engaged
wholly in intrastate commerce and to employees engaged in
interstate commerce. The court held by a substantial majority
that Congress has only the power to deal with the question in so
far as employees are engaged in interstate commerce.
It is now contended that the Congress of the United States, by
the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 19o8,
undertook to legislate and has so legislated on the same subject
matter, as was legislated upon by the legislature of the state of
New York when it enacted the New York Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, and that Congress by the enactment of the Act of
19o8 takes all cases of injuries to workmen employed by railroads
engaged in interstate commerce out of the operation of the New
York Workmen's Compensation Act and out of the jurisdiction
of the state administrative boards of the state of New York,
created to administer the New York Workmen's Compensation
Act.'
The decision of the Supreme Court of New York state holds
that this is not the case, and that the provisions of the New
York Compensation Act do apply to employees injured in the
state of New York, notwithstanding that said employees are
employees of railways, engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.
"Jensen v. Southern Pacific Company, 9 N. C. C. A., note p. 3o7.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
We shall proceed to show that the Congress of the United
States, by the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
of 19o8, did not legislate on the same subject matter as that cov-
ered by the New York Workmen's Compensation Act. That the
latter is based entirely upon different grounds and purposes from
that which underlie the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Stated otherwise our problem is:
The Southern Pacific Company, which was the owner-of the
steamship that the plaintiff was assisting in unloading, made the
defense that no recovery could be had under the compensation
act for the reason that the liability was governed by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, but the court held that there was no
evidence that the steamer was being used in connection with the
railroad and that the federal act did not attempt to govern or
include the field of liability of carriers by water to their
employees.
Suppose that the steamer in question was operated in connec-
tion with the defendant company. Would the defense of the
railroad company be a good defense? We undertake to show
that it would not be a good defense.
II
ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP CREATED BETWEEN EMPLOYER
AND EMPLOYEE AS A RESULT OF THE ENACTMENT OF AN
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE ACT OF WORKMEN
The distinction between the principles of law applicable on
the one hand to the common law of torts and employers' liability
acts, and on the other hand those applicable to industrial insurance
or workmen's compensation may be stated as follows:
The body of law involved in the law of torts and employers'
liability statutes pertains entirely to the redress of private wrongs.
In such instances liability results in the payment of damages to the
employee, intended to be commensurate with and to reimburse him
for the injury suffered. Such law has for its sole object and
end, the regulating of private rights, that is, the readjustment of
relationship between individuals, to reproduce the parity pre-
sumptively existing between them.
On the other hand, the obligations of industrial insurance and
workmen's compensation accrue from contingencies not depend-
ent upon or within the control of the parties, and thus have no
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relationship whatever to the conduct of the parties; hence these
obligations are not based upon wrongs. It follows then that they
must pertain to the subject of government regulations, and are
in the nature of economic provisions taking the form of indirect
taxation levied to regulate occupations, for on what other basis
would the government be justified in writing into the labor con-
tract against the will of the parties, an insurance policy? Were
this not so, industrial insurance or workmen's compensation
would be free from the standpoint of both the employee and the
employer, without basis of justice or equity, for the theory of
such laws is that compensation is not to be commensurate with
injury but is to be based upon wages, thus substituting for the for-
mer obligations based upon tort, which offer damages commensur-
ate with injury, a purely arbitrary sum. Such a scheme can have
no relation to the adjustment of private wrongs. If it be justifi-
able it must be on the sociological theory of the right of the state
to levy a tax for the purpose of protecting from an economic
standpoint, the community as a whole.
It therefore follows that in our analysis of constitutional limita-
tions we cannot look for any analogy in the decisions which have
to do with the regulation of the private relations between the
.employer and his employees. However, for this purpose, there
have been brought into the earlier stages of the discussions on
this subject cases which hold a statute of Pennsylvania constitu-
tional which abolished the doctrine of respondent superior in the
cases of persons on or near railroads and not in the employ of
the railroad company ;7 cases which hold statutes constitutional
that make railroads liable for fires set by engines though without
fault;" cases holding a statute constitutional making a railroad
company liable for injury though without fault;9 or the common
illustrations, as the liability of a master for the acts of his servant,
or the ancient law of deodands, or the liability of the husband for
the tort of his wife. All of the common law or statutory duties
defined in these decisions relate to the preservation of private
rights.
Our problem is therefore the following: Has the state the
power to regulate its industries for the purpose of.protecting the
health, safety and general welfare of the community, by levying
'See Kirby v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 76 Pa. 5o6, and Martin v. Pitts-
burgh & L. B. R. Co., 2o3 U. S. 284.
$See St. L. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. i.
'See C. R. L & P. R. R. v. Zernicke, 183 U. S. 582.
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a tax in the form of an insurance obligation upon such industries,
for the benefit of all employees injured while employed in the
same?
And assuming that the state has the right to levy such a tax,
may it in appropriating private rights for the benefit of the gen-
eral welfare, take, as a part of the same, from the employee the
right which belongs to him, to compensate himself for his per-
sonal injury caused by the default of his employer, by recovering
damages from the latter?
III
NATURE OF THE REMEDY PROVIDED BY THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT OF 1908
The purpose and only effect of the enactment by the Congress
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 19o8 is to abolish
entirely the "fellow-servant rule," -and to a limited extent the
effectiveness of the common law defenses of the "assumed risk"
in certain cases, and that of "contributory negligence," by sub-
stituting therefor the doctrine of "comparative negligence."
The act left the cause of action of the employee of a railroad
company engaged in interstate trade based upon the default or
negligence of his employer, his agents and his employees; and
cut down the employer's defenses as described, thereby increasing
such an employer's chances of recovery heretofore existing by
not to exceed twenty per cent.10 Recovery under the federal act
is based upon a tort of which the' railroad company is charged
as being guilty.
The New York Workmen's Compensation Act makes it com-
pulsory upon all employers described in forty-two classes of
employments to pay the universal compensation provided for in
the act on account of any injuries to or death of employees
engaged in said employments, without regard to any fault of
either employer or employee, excepting the wilful fault of
either, to such injured employees, or the dependents thereof in
case of death.
Such employers are compelled to secure such compensation to
their employees in one of three ways:
"Economic Basis of Compulsory Insurance, Michigan Law Review,
Vol. X, No. 3, March, 1912. Where millions of accidents are ctnsidered,
the causes of the accidents are attributable to fellow-servants in 5.297
of the cases.
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i. "By insuring and keeping insured the payment of such
compensation in the state insurance fund," or
2. "By insuring and keeping insured the payment of such
compensation with firms, persons or corporations authorized to
transact the business of workmen's compensation insurance in
the state of New York" or
3. "By furnishing satisfactory proof to the commission of
his ability to pay such compensation for himself."
The principle involved in raising the fund provided by the New
York Workmen's Compensation Act from which shall be paid the
compensation to the injured, is based primarily upon raising a
state insurance fund by levying an insurance premium of the
nature of a tax upon all employers covered by the act. This in
substance is true, whether the employer pursues plans 1, 2, or 3
cited above.
The existence of the public purpose which justifies the state in
taxing employers in this manner consists in the fact that, if such
a tax were not levied, many minor children of tender years would
be made dependent upon public charity and be prevented from
attending school long enough to receive such training as would
enable them to support themselves, and wives and injured persons
would also be made dependent upon public charity.11
The compensations made and provided by the New York Com-
pensation Act are limited (as they are in all other compensation
acts) to such amounts as conserve the public purpose, to-wit:-
to prevent the dependents of injured and killed workmen from
becoming charges and to keep their minor dependent children- of
tender years in school long enough to give them such training as
will render them self-supporting.
All injured workmen and all dependents of killed workmen are
compensated without regard to the fault of either the employer or
employees excepting in case of wilful and malicious fault of either
which takes each party out of the statute. No such basis exists
for the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of
19o8. Less than twenty-five per cent of injured workmen
recover under it.1 2 The injured worker is supposed to recover
complete compensation for his injury in case h6 has a good cause
of action.
Ui o N. C. C. A. 7, note under Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury.
"Economic Basis of Compulsory Industrial Insurance, Michigan Law
Review, Vol. X, No. 3, March, 1912.
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The causes of fifty to fifty-five per cent of all injuries is due
to the inevitable risk of the business' 2 and can in no way be
traced to the fault or negligence of the employer or his employees.
But all of these are compensated under the New York act (and
all compensation acts). Whereas, the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act does not contemplate the recovery of compensation for
any of them. It only conteinplates a recovery when the negli-
gence or default of the employer, his agents or employees, can
be proven, which can be done in less than thirty per cent of the
cases. And even in these cases (30%) the plaintiff's chances
of recovery are still further reduced in those cases where the
plaintiff assumed the risk, or his own negligence contributed to
the cause of the accident.1 3
The Federal Employers' Liability Act as in the case with all
employers' liability acts pertains entirely to the redress of private
wrongs and has for its sole object and end the regulating of
private rights. But the obligations of industrial insurance and
workmen's compensation accrue from contingencies not depend-
ent upon or within the control of the parties and therefore have
no relationship whatever to the conduct of the parties and hence
are not based upon wrongs. It follows that they pertain to the
subject of government regulations and are economic provisions
taking the form of indirect taxation.
Hence no public purpose is pretended to be conserved by the
Federal Employers' Liability Act of 19o8, as is the case with the
New York .Workmen's Compefisation Act.
Admitting, therefore, the doctrine that in case Congress has
enacted a law, the subjeqt matter of which deals with the regula-
tions of interstate and foreign commerce, by providing industrial
insurance for the use and benefit of injured workmen and the
dependents of killed workmen, engaged in the same, such subject
matter would be removed from the possibility of legislation
thereon by any state legislation; it follows from what has been
shown above, that Congress by enacting the Federal Employers'
Liability Act did not legislate, or attempt to legislate on the
subject matter of workmen's compensation acts, or that of
industrial insurance.
That a public purpose, such as is required to exist before the
state is authorized to provide insurance, limited in amount,
against sickness, invalidity, old-age, for the benefit of injured
"Federal Employers' Liability Act, Secs. 3 & 4.
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workmen and dependents of killed workmen, by compulsory tax-
ation, direct or indirect, does not exist in the cases just named, may
be shown, as has been shown in the case of insurance against
bodily injuries by thirty-one state compensation acts already
enacted. 14  Space does not permit an analytical proof of this
assertion.yr
Mr. Roberts in his note to Jensen v. Southern Pacific Com-
pany16 says:
"Both statutes cannot apply in the same field and there-
fore both cannot cover the same injury and the question
of the applicability of the two laws certainly should not
turn upon the further question of the existence or absence
of negligence, for if an employee is injured through the
violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act no negli-
gence need be shown. Obviously Congress by this statute
intended to cover the entire field of the liability of
interstate railroads to employees engaged in interstate
commerce."
The conclusion which Mr. Roberts here states does not follow.
The Federal Safety Appliance Act simply makes the failure to
provide the "appliances" defined therein "negligence per se"
or defines a new tort upon the conviction of which the guilty
company may be fined and recovery of damages had, in the same
manner as state statutes which make it a tort for a railroad com-
pany to fail to properly "block" frogs where the courts held
that such failure is negligence per se.
1 7
The fallacy in Mr. Roberts' argument lies 'in the assumption
that Congress legislated on the subject matter of workmen's
compensation acts when it enacted the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.
Additional proof of the correctness of the writer's position is
the following:
Judge Foran of the Court of Common Pleas of Cleveland,
Ohio, in his opinion of July 9, 1915, in the cases: John Vato v.
The River Terminal and Railway Company, No. 140-141, etc.,
said:
14lo N. C. C. A. i, note.
"Bulletin of U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics No. I86 (for i915), pp.
305, 308, 312, 340, 375, 378, 393, 398, 418, 435; Debrot v. Marion County,
145 N. W. 467 (Supreme Court of Iowa, Feb. 19, 1914).
s9 N. C. C. A. 3o.
'7 Narramore v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 37 C. C. A. Syll. pp. 3,
499 and 50o-1; Railway Co. V. Van Home, 16 C. C. A. i82.
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"If the driver of a lumber wagon, in the course of his
master's business, is negligently injured by a railroad
company while crossing its tracks upon a public highway,
he may recover from the wrong-doer, notwithstanding he
has recovered compensation or has been awarded com-
pensation by the state industrial commission from the state
insurance fund, for the injury."
The enactment of laws which provide social insurance, limiting
the amounts to be paid, so as to conform to the public purposes
indicated, by both state and federal governments, is but the fur-
ther extension of the Christian conception of the state. The
establishment of such laws is one of the most effective methods
for conserving the unit of the state, the family of the working
classes. Such protection conserves the physical, potential power
of the state by means of which the state must stand or fall when
the state is attacked by armed enemies.
JAMES HAIRINGTON BoYD.
ToLEno, OH o, February 12, 1916.
